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ARMS CONTROL PROVISIONS IN THE OUTER




The provisions of the Outer Space Treaty' relating to the military uses
of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, constitute
a significant landmark in man's efforts to control the use of atomic
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to prevent military
confrontations on celestial bodies.2 The relevant control provisions are
found in article IV of the Treaty and read as follows:
*Chairman of the Graduate Program of the School of Law and Professor of Law, University of
Mississippi School of Law; author of LAW AND POLITICS OF THE DANUBE: AN INTER-DIsCIPLINARY
STUDY (1964).
'Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] 3 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty].
'Comparatively few articles have appeared in print dealing specifically with article IV of the
Outer Space Treaty. See Gorove, Some Thoughts on Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, in
PROCEEDINGS ON THE THIRTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 79 (1971); Mar-
koff, Sur l'interprtation juridique de I'article IV du Trait rbgissant les activitibs spatiales des
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There is, however, a wealth of literature dealing with various aspects of the legal implications
of the military uses of outer space. See Brennan, Arms and Arms Control in Outer Space, in
OUTER SPACE: PROSPECTS FOR MAN AND SOCIETY 123 (L. Bloomfield ed. 1962); Cooper, Self
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Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful" in the Light of the Space Treaty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
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ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around
the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies,
or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States
Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establish-
ment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of
any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvers on celes-
tial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scien-
tific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohib-
ited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful explo-
ration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohib-
ited.3
The object of this presentation is to analyze and interpret these provi-
sions, which may conveniently be broken down into two categories: (1)
those provisions dealing with nuclear and other weapons of mass de-
struction and (2) those dealing with the peaceful uses of the moon and
other celestial bodies.
NUCLEAR AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Paragraph one of article IV of the Treaty relates to nuclear weapons
and any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.4 The initial prob-
lem presented by the Treaty is the lack of a definition of what consti-
tutes a "nuclear weapon" or a "weapon of mass destruction." It may
be presumed that all arms which utilize atomic energy in accomplishing
their intended purpose, irrespective of their size or destructive force,
would be regarded as nuclear weapons. At the same time, it also may
be assumed that conventional weapons do not come under the category
of either nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction.
While there is no indication in the Treaty as to how many people must
Further background materials and generalized discussions may also be found in textbooks on
space law: C. CHRISTOL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE, (Naval War College,
International Law Studies 1962, No. 55, 1966); H. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING
TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE (1970); L. LIPSON AND N. KATZENBACH, REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1961); N.
MATTE, AEROSPACE LAW (1969). M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC
ORDER IN SPACE (1963); M. VASQUEZ, COSMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965).
'Outer Space Treaty, supra note I, at art. IV, para. 23.
4This stipulation is an outgrowth of the so-called "no bombs in orbit" resolution of the United
Nations General Assembly which called upon all states "to refrain from placing in orbit around
the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other
manner." Question of General and Complete Disarmament, G.A. Res. 1884, 18 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 15 at 13 U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
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be affected to constitute a weapon of mass destruction, a group of 20
to 30 people or less probably would not constitute such a mass. If on
the other hand, bacteriological and chemical weapons were used, even
against a small group, then these weapons would seem to fall under the
category of weapons of mass destruction.'
The primary obligation in paragraph one concerning "nuclear weap-
ons and any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction" is that the
states parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the
earth any objects carrying such weapons.' The phrase "orbit around the
earth" clearly implies that a full orbit rather than a fractional orbit or
suborbital flight is intended.' Thus, the provision is not meant to outlaw
the use of ICBM's with nuclear warheads. At the same time, an orbiting
missile killer or laser would be prohibited, regardless of whether or not
it was intended for defensive or offensive purposes.
Second, the states parties to the Treaty undertake not to install nu-
clear and other weapons of mass destruction on celestial bodies or
station them in outer space in any other manner.' The drafters omitted
any reference to the moon in this provision even though in other parts
of the Treaty they have fairly consistently referred to the "moon and
other celestial bodies." It is by no means clear, however, whether the
omission of the word "moon" was intentional, or if the implication is
correct that no restriction is placed on the installation of atomic weap-
ons on the moon. One may surmise, however, from the frequently used
phrase "moon and other celestial bodies" that the moon is to be re-
garded as a celestial body under the Treaty. Moreover, it would make
little sense to permit installation of weapons of mass destruction on the
moon while prohibiting such installation on other celestial bodies, when
man's use of the latter looms in the more distant future.
Significant questions with respect to the interpretation of paragraph
one of article IV relate to the meaning of the words "install" and
"station." At what point does a weapon become installed? Is the mere
presence of a weapon on a celestial body prohibited? Furthermore, what
constitutes stationing in outer space? Is this identical with orbiting, or
'See Statements by U.N. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Cyrus R. Vance made prior to Senate ratification of the Treaty, in Hearings on the Treaty on Outer
Space Before the Senate Foreign Rel. Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 23, 76, 100 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
'Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV, para. 1.
7This interpretation implies that the object must have been placed into full orbit around the earth
rather than into a fractional orbit but it leaves open the question whether or not the object must
have actually completed at least one full orbit before it could come under the Treaty's prohibition.
'Outer Space Treaty, supra note I, at art. IV, para. 1.
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does it have a distinct meaning? Any definition of installation of a
weapon should require something more than the mere presence of a
weapon on a celestial body. On the other hand, station should be inter-
preted to include the placing of a weapon in a relatively fixed orbit in
relation to the underlying celestial body, such that the speed of the
orbiting object would coincide with the speed of rotation of the celestial
body.'
The prohibition against nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction, strictly speaking, relates only to "objects" which carry
such weapons but not to the weapons themselves."0 The probable reason
for this stipulation is that at present, nuclear weapons can not be
placed in orbit without being transported by another object. Para-
graph one of article IV uses the word "undertake" to describe the
parties' agreement about such objects instead of the more commonly
used and rigorous term "shall." This distinction arises because the lan-
guage in article IV-unlike that of article I-is not reflective of a gen-
eral obligation binding upon all states. Rather, article IV enumerates
specific duties imposed only upon the states parties to the Treaty.
Paragraph one of article IV appears to deal only with weapons that
would orbit around the earth, their installation on celestial bodies or
their stationing in outer space. There is, however, no specific restriction
on the orbiting of weapons around celestial bodies, apart from station-
ary orbiting." The reason for this omission is not entirely clear. Possi-
bly, such orbiting for some time to come will not have any practical
military significance.
USE FOR "PEACEFUL" PURPOSES
The second paragraph of article IV states that the moon and other
celestial bodies shall be used by the parties exclusively for peaceful
purposes. Like paragraph one, this provision obligates only the states
parties to the Treaty and is not declaratory of a more general obligation.
It should also be noted that this provision makes no reference to outer
space. This is not an accidental omission. Both paragraphs one and two
'Some writers give a very liberal interpretation to the word "station." According to Poulantzas,
for instance, the phrase "or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner" includes
every manner in which nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction could be placed in outer
space or on celestial bodies. Poulantzas, supra note 2, at 67-68. While the Treaty negotiations give
little, if any, indication regarding the relevant intention of the drafters, it appears likely that station,
much like installation, was meant to convey more than just sheer presence in outer space-possibly
presence coupled with some sense of permanence.
*Outer Space Treaty, supra note I, at art. IV, para. I.
"But see note 9 supra.
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of article IV express the underlying policy of prohibiting only certain
uses of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space,
yet not completely outlawing their use."
Paragraph two refers to the "moon and other celestial bodies," rais-
ing the question of the precise meaning of these terms, particularly
whether or not the term "moon" should include not only the physical
mass of the moon, but also its gravitational area."3 The same question
could also be raised with respect to other celestial bodies which may be
in solid, fluid or gaseous states.
Another interesting problem that may have some practical relevance
to the future application of paragraph two relates to the size of celestial
bodies. How large must a celestial body be to be considered such a
body? Would a meteorite or asteroid or a small moon of a celestial body
constitute such a body under the terms of the Treaty? An example of
the potential problems was indicated when not long ago scientists re-
ported that it might become technically feasible for a future space expe-
dition to steal one of the smaller size moons (5-10 miles in diameter) of
Mars, to remove it from its Martian orbit and to place it in orbit around
the earth, and thus effectively change the solar system. 4 Would the
removal of a celestial body from its natural position by human interven-
tion change its characterization as a celestial body under the Treaty? A
meteorite which lands on earth by natural forces and without human
interference presumably loses its designation as a celestial body under
the Treaty." But the same is probably not true with respect to the
example of the Martian moon.
"Both the preparatory work and the negotiations leading up to the Treaty clearly indicate that
the drafters did not intend to go beyond the textual stipulation and impose on outer space the
requirement that it must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. See generally Hearings, supra
note 4; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, 90TH CONG., IST
SESS., REPORT ON TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLO-
RATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES
(Comm. Print 1967) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. See also Subcomm. on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, 21 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, vol. II, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/35 (1966); Comm.
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report, 21 U.N. GAOR, Annexes vol. 11, U.N. Doc. A/6431
(1966).
'"Similar problems arise in connection with determining the demarcation line between the earth
and outer space. Cf. Gorove, The Recovery and Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space: A
Legal Analysis and Interpretation, 4 INT'L LAWYER 682, 684 (1970).
"According to the report, one of the Martian moons, Deimos, which has a diameter of about 5
miles, is located more than 12,500 miles above the surface of Mars, whereas the other moon,
Phobos, which is about twice the size of Deimos, is only about 4,000 miles from the planet.
Memphis Commercial Appeal, Jan. 27, 1970, at 5, cols. 3-4.
t
"Cf. Gorove, Interpreting Article I1 of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 351
(1969).
[Vol. 3: 114
ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE
Paragraph two contains one of the most controversial provisions in
the Outer Space Treaty. The meaning of "peaceful" has given rise to
at least two major interpretations. Under one interpretation the word
"peaceful" means nonmilitary," while under a second interpretation
the term means nonaggressive.' 7
There is a vast difference insofar as the outcome of these two dif-
ferent interpretations is concerned. Under the former interpretation no
military activities could be conducted on the moon and other celestial
bodies except those which are specifically permissible under the para-
graph two language, e.g., the use of military personnel for scientific
research. Under the latter interpretation, activities nonaggressive in
nature would be permissible, even if they are conducted by the military,
with certain exceptions. These exceptiofis are those specifically forbid-
den by article IV, e.g., the establishment of military bases, installations
and fortifications, the testing of any types of weapons and the conduct
of military maneuvers on celestial bodies. Those advocating this
second position have referred to the Charter of the United Nations for
their meaning of peaceful." The former position is supported by the
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency which distinguishes
peaceful from military uses of atomic energy. 9
In reality it would appear that the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty
have not adopted either of the above interpretations. Two facts support
a meaning of peaceful that is distinct from earlier usages. First, certain
"This interpretation has been championed mostly, though not exclusively, by the Soviet Union
and Soviet writers. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at I1; Zhukov, supra note 2, at 36. For a
list of additional writers, see Markov, The Juridical Meaning of the Term "Peaceful" in the 1967
Space Treaty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE
30, 34 (1969).
'"This has been the position of the United States and many Western writers. See, e.g., L. LIPSON
& N. KATZENBACH, supra note 2, at 25; Meyer, supra note 2, at 26. It should be noted, however,
that as Markov points out, it would be incorrect to characterize the literature in the oversimplified
terms of a "Russian" or an "American" doctrine in relation to the interpretation of the term
"peaceful." Markov, supra note 15, at 34. For a keen analysis of the early literature on the
problem, see M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, supra note 2, at 395.
'"The U.N. Charter does not prohibit military activities in general but outlaws threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, (paras. 2 & 4),
39-51.
"Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, art. 2, Oct. 26, 1956, [19571 U.S.T. 1093,
T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 which reads:
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to
peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able,
that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not
used in such a way as to further any military purpose. (emphasis added)
For a comprehensive discussion of the meaning of peaceful versus military uses in relation to
nuclear energy, see Gorove, Distinguishing "Peaceful" from "Military" Uses of Atomic Energy:
Some Facts and Considerations, 30 OHIO ST.L.J. 495 (1969).
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activities, such as scientific research or the use of any equipment and
facility necessary for peaceful exploration are not prohibited, even if
undertaken by the military. Second, certain other activities, such as the
establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the test-
ing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers, are
forbidden even if these activities are of a nonaggressive nature."0
It would seem that the drafters of the Treaty have made a serious,
and at least a partially successful, attempt to get away from the some-
what artificial and practically unworkable distinction between peaceful
purposes on the one hand, and military or aggressive purposes on the
other hand. The trouble with these traditional distinctions has been that
a particular endeavor such as aerial photography may be used for both
purposes, i.e., furnishing cloud cover information for meteorological
purposes as well as for military reconnaissance. In the case of aerial
photography there is no present international machinery by which the
ultimate use of an aerial photograph can be determined. Since it is
unlikely that such a machinery will be agreed upon in the near future,
it would appear much more productive to abandon the artificial and
essentially relative distinction between peaceful and military purposes
or peaceful and aggressive purposes, and focus instead on the prohibi-
tion or permission of the particular activity involved.
One possible standard is the relation of an activity to national secur-
ity. Certain activities may not be as critical or significant as others.
Therefore, it would be better to identify those activities which constitute
minimal threats to national security and permit those regardless of the
ultimate purpose for such activities or their conduct by military person-
nel. In this manner the whole bothersome issue of peaceful versus mili-
tary or aggressive could be avoided for the most part, although ques-
tions of interpretation would still remain. For example, nation states
may decide to permit photography of their underlying territories from
outer space regardless of the ultimate purpose for the photographs. If
this were to be done, the type of problem which might arise would relate
only to the interpretation of the word "photography," which would
appear to be much more easily identifiable than any ultimate use or
hidden purpose."'
Admittedly, there might be many other phrases less easily interpreted
than the word "photography." For instance, what is the meaning of a
military base, installation or fortification? What constitutes a base?
How large does it have to be to become a base? When does a base
'Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV, para. 2.
2
"Gorove, supra note 2, at 126.
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become a military base? Is a base built by civilians a military base or a
civilian base? Are all bases built by the military necessarily military
bases? What if they are jointly built both by military and civilian person-
nel? Does the actual use of a base make any difference, or does the
ultimate purpose for which it has been built have a controlling voice in
the determination? Just when does a military base become established?
Does it have to be completed and fully operational to become estab-
lished or would the partial establishment also be forbidden? The same
questions could also be raised with respect to an installation or fortifica-
tion. Furthermore, are military bases, installations and fortifications
inclusive or exclusive terms? Are fortifications and bases smaller or
larger than installations?
In response to these questions, one may observe that a military base
normally refers to a center of military activities or a source of military
supplies, whereas a fortification refers to a series of structures, walls or
furnishings, which are used to strengthen a position against enemy at-
tack. An installation may refer to any apparatus which is in position for
use.22 It also would appear that any kind of establishment, whether
partial or complete, would fall under the prohibition, just as the testing
of weapons would cover any and all segments of the testing procedure.
Under a strict interpretation of paragraph two any use of weapons
on celestial bodies which does not involve testing is allowed under article
IV as long as the use is for peaceful purposes. In fact, if such strict
interpretation is carried to its logical conclusion, the same observation
would be applicable to atomic weapons as long as they are not in orbit
around the earth, installed on celestial bodies or stationed in outer
space.
Article IV's prohibition against the establishment of bases, installa-
tions and fortifications is applicable only to "celestial bodies." While
there is no reference here to the moon, as was previously discussed, it
would appear that the moon is considered a celestial body.2 1
It may also be of interest to point out that the use of any equipment
or facility is permissible under paragraph two so long as such use is
necessary for the peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial
rThe original United States draft spoke only of "military bases and fortifications" whereas the
Soviet draft used the phrase "military bases and installations." The final language incorporated
in Part. IV, para. 2 of the Treaty, referring to "military bases, installations and fortifications," is
a compromise between the initial U.S. and Soviet positions. For text of the drafts and letters of
transmittal see Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report, 21 U.N. GAOR, Annexes,
vol. I1, U.N. Doc. A/6431 (1966).
2'For a similar argument regarding omission of the word "moon" in prohibiting the installation
of weapons on celestial bodies, see p. 116 supra.
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bodies.24 Therefore, it would appear that military equipment or facilities
could legitimately be used for such purpose. However, as pointed out,
it may be argued that the word peaceful was not meant to imply nonmil-
itary.
A similar argument may be predicated on the language in paragraph
two that allows the use of military personnel for scientific research or
for any other peaceful purposes. 2 Thus, scientific research is regarded
by the drafters as an activity basically of a peaceful character. This is
the connotation that may reasonably be drawn from the use of the
phrase "for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes.1 2 It
may then be safe to assume that no scientific research is prohibited by
the Treaty regardless of whether or not it is conducted by civilian or
military personnel. There may be strong doubts about this assumption,
but the express language does not place any restriction on the objective
of the research. Thus, the object of the research, whether the advance-
ment of science, military defense, or perhaps even outright aggression,
would have no bearing on the lawfulness of any research activity under
paragraph two. Admittedly, this construction may run contrary to the
general spirit and other provisions of the Treaty, i.e., that the explora-
tion and use of outer space be carried out for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries, and that the moon and other celestial bodies
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. However, the wording of the
provision pertaining to the free use of military personnel for scientific
research makes no mention of the moon or other celestial bodies or, for
that matter, of outer space. Thus, one may assume that it was meant
to apply generally. The drafters of the Treaty have indicated that scien-
tific research should not be curtailed and realistically they have allowed
the use of military personnel to further such research. It is reasonable
to conclude that regardless of its objective or where it takes place,
scientific research is favored by the Treaty terms.27
ASSESSMENT
The arms control provisions of the Outer Space Treaty are broad
24Outer Space Treaty, supra note I, at art. IV, para. 2. The United States, over Soviet opposi-
tion, successfully argued that the use of military equipment on the moon and other celestial bodies
was essential because equipment for this type operation had, in many cases, been developed through
military research. Cf. Dembling & Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR. L.
& COM. 419, 432-33 (1967).
25Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV, para. 2.
2Ild.27Also, scientific research, regardless of its ultimate purpose, is not in and of itself outlawed under
the U.N. Charter.
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indicators of man's concern with the prevention of the extension of the
arms race into his newly unfolding spacial environment. The language
in paragraph one of article IV should be hailed as a significant step in
this general direction.
At the same time, it is perhaps not surprising to find that the Treaty
provisions concerning arms control also reflect some of the general
fears, suspicions, antagonisms and rivalries prevailing in world politics.
Certainly, the weapons limitation provisions of paragraph one, and per-
haps to a lesser extent the provisions in paragraph two concerning the
use of the moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, seem
to indicate a general hesitancy on the part of the atomic power parties
to curtail entirely the use of nuclear weapons in outer space, even on
distant celestial bodies. The language chosen also reflects many prob-
lems of meaning and interpretation which are not necessarily peculiar
to this treaty.
The Treaty has not solved the problem of the meaning and interpreta-
tion to be given to the term "peaceful." In determining the future uses
of the moon and other celestial bodies, the present analysis suggests that
if we desire to introduce some measure of certainty it would be better
to abandon such a general and undefined phrase and instead identify
permissible or prohibited activities. The relevant Treaty provisions, 8 are
indicative of a partial attempt to move in this direction. However, it
seems somewhat unfortunate that they do not provide for further identi-
fication of specific problem areas so as to avoid endless arguments as
to whether the word "peaceful" means nonmilitary or nonaggressive or
perhaps something else. Even though questions of interpretation would
still remain concerning the scope of prohibited activities, these could be
resolved by a definition of important terms in a future outer space
convention. Such a convention would be desirable particularly in the
wake of The Agreement on the Rescue and Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Space Objects 9 and other agreements complementing and
spelling out in detail the rights and obligations incorporated in the Outer
Space Treaty. It could also resolve some of the serious inconsistencies
and queries suggested by this article.
sThe relevant provisions of the Treaty are patterned after the Antartic Treaty terms. See The
Antarctic Treaty, Dec. I, 1959, [1961] I U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
2
'Apr. 22, 1968, [1968] 6 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599. For thorough analyses of the Agree-
ment's provisions see Gorove, Legal Problems of the Rescue and Return of Astronauts, 3 INT'L
LAWYER 898 (1969); Gorove, supra note 12.
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